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Community size is often found to be negatively correlated with prosocial behaviors such
as formal volunteering, working on public projects and informal help to friends and strangers
(Putnam 2000, p. 119, 206). This may be because people who reside in large communities
simply spend less time socializing with each other. As a result, people living in large cities
have on average fewer friends, and hence their social networks support less cooperation.1
A complementary channel, which has received less attention in the literature, is that
community size may a ect outcomes by changing other aspects of the network structure.
Speciﬁcally, even holding ﬁxed the number of friends, we expect social networks in small
communities to exhibit greater network closure, i.e., be more interconnected. The intuition
is straightforward: in small communities, the pool of potential friends is limited, which
increases the extent to which the network neighborhoods of two friends are likely to overlap.
Coleman (1990) suggested that variation in network closure can directly a ect outcomes.
In particular, he argued that networks with higher closure generate high trust between
friends, which facilitates cooperation and thus improves welfare. The logic is that networks
with high closure allow for greater social sanctions between individuals through common
friends, thus increasing incentives for cooperation.
In this paper, we empirically evaluate the e ect of community size on network closure in
one speciﬁc social environment: schools. We make use of the National Longitudinal Study
of Adolescent Health (AddHealth) which has detailed social network information for about
86,000 students in 142 US middle and high schools. Our main ﬁnding is a strong negative
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1relationship between grade size and network closure. We also ﬁnd that grade size is negatively
associated with prosocial behavior.2 We then explore whether this community size e ect on
outcomes can be partially attributed to the network closure channel.
I Theory and Estimation Framework
Community Size and Network Structure. Community size can a ect network structure by in-
ﬂuencing the evolution of friendship links between agents. To see the logic, imagine that the
social network is generated by a random process where (a) agents’ preferences for socializing
with other agents are i.i.d. draws from a known distribution and (b) agents are more likely to
interact with those who are around them (see e.g., Jackson and Rogers (2006)). With such a
process, the degree distribution measuring the number of friends per agent will be indepen-
dent of community size. However, the friends of an agent in a small community will likely
be friends with each other, because there are few other potential friends. This generates
overlapping neighborhoods and high network closure. In contrast, in a large community the
friends of an agent are likely to have di erent friends, leading to non-overlapping neighbor-
hoods and low closure. This model predicts that the social networks in small communities
should exhibit higher network closure.
A Measure of Network Closure. To empirically assess the magnitude of the above channel,
we will use the measure of network closure developed by Mobius and Szeidl (2006). We now
explain and provide intuition for this measure.
First we introduce the idea of a trust ﬂow, which measures the degree to which agents in
a social network can cooperate. Deﬁne the trust ﬂow between two agents s and t to be the
number of disjoint paths in the network connecting them, where all edges in a path must
be within distance K from agent s.3 Here K governs the size of the “circle of trust,” i.e.,
the set of agents who can be used to enforce cooperation. Intuitively, high trust ﬂow means
that s and t have better incentives to cooperate because they have access to greater social
sanctions over each other should one of them defect.
To measure network closure for a given circle of trust K, consider an agent s, and compute
the trust ﬂow between s and all other agents in the network. Let the sum of these pairwise
2In the education literature, there is substantial agreement that smaller schools are associated with better
outcomes (Cotton 2001). Possible mechanisms beyond the closure channel include teacher attitudes (Lee
and Loeb 2000), improved safety (Wasley, Fine, Gladden, Holland, King, Mosak and Powell 2000), decision-
making autonomy (ibid), and more parent involvement (Mitchell 2000). In economics, Hoxby (2000) and
Angrist and Lavy (1999) show the connection between class size and student achievement.
3The distance between an agent and an edge is the average of the distances between the agent and the
two endpoints of the edge.
2ﬂows be the total trust of agent s, which measures how much cooperation can s expect
from the network. For any positive integer m, compute the share of this total trust that
comes from pairwise trust ﬂows exceeding m. The resulting number which we refer to as
(m,K)-closure of agent s, is a measure of the closure of the network around agent s. Loosely
speaking, high (m,K)-closure can be interpreted as s having high pairwise trust with a small
number of agents, while lower closure means having low pairwise trust with a large number
of agents.
It is important to note that closure can vary across networks even if the network size
and degree distribution is held ﬁxed. For example, ﬁgure 1 shows two networks where each
of the 6 agents have two friends. However, agent s has lower closure in the network on the
left. To see this formally, let K =1 .5; the trust ﬂows between s and all other agents for this
K are shown in the ﬁgure. In both networks, s enjoys a total trust of 4. However, in the
left network this total trust comes from low pairwise trust ﬂows of 1 from four other agents,
while in the right network it comes from high pairwise trust ﬂows of 2 from two other agents.
Hence agent s has (1,K)-closure of 0 in the left network, and (1,K)-closure of 1 in the right
network.
Is high or low closure better for agent s? That depends on what he wants to use the
network for. If he needs the network for valuable transactions, then high closure is better.
While high closure provides access to only a few agents, s can ask valuable favors from all of
these. In contrast, if s needs to engage in transactions of lower value, he prefers the greater
access to people provided by the low-closure network.
Estimation Framework. To evaluate the e ect of community size on network closure, we
will estimate equations of the form
(1) closure =   +   · community size +   · controls +  
where   measures the causal e ect of community size on network closure,   captures unob-
served variation and measurement error, and the controls refer to other social and economic
factors that can inﬂuence network structure. One important control variable is an agent’s
number of friends, also called degree. Degree matters because it can be related to both com-
munity size and closure. More speciﬁcally, community size may a ect the network structure
through inﬂuencing degree: For example, if people in small communities invest more in so-
cial interactions, they end up with more friends. Alternatively, people in large communities
may ﬁnd a bigger potential market for friends, and as a result develop more connections.
This e ect of community size on degree can bias the estimation of (1) because degree is
also positively correlated with closure: networks with higher average degree tend to be more
3interconnected. To deal with this di culty, we include ﬂexible controls for degree in our
speciﬁcations.
We will also be interested in the e ects of the variation in closure generated by community
size on social and educational outcomes. To assess the importance of this channel, we will
ﬁrst estimate the total e ect of community size on outcomes using the following speciﬁcation:
(2) outcome =   +   · community size +   · controls +  .
Here the total e ect of size is measured by  . To assess how much of this e ect is due to
variation in network closure, we then estimate
(3) outcome =  
  +  
  · community size +   · closure +  
  · controls +  
 .
If part of the e ect of size on outcomes is mediated through network closure, then we expect
that the absolute value of the coe cient on size falls as we include closure in the regression
(|  | < | |). Moreover, using the estimated coe cients in these regressions, we can measure
the relative contribution of the network closure channel in the total e ect of size on outcomes.
This analysis, like others using school size as an independent variable, is frustrated by the
lack of exogenous variation in grade size. Our estimation procedure requires that the error
terms in regressions (1), (2) and (3) are orthogonal to the key size and closure variables.
One possible concern with this assumption is that in equation (1) size may be correlated
with closure beyond its causal e ect, for example if size is related to other environmental
factors that a ect network structure. Similarly, in equation (3) closure may be correlated
with the outcome variable through an omitted variable, like the sociability of the school’s
teachers. We attempt to alleviate theses concerns by including a rich set of controls, such as
social and economic factors, in all regressions. However, we cannot fully rule out alternative
explanations, and hence we interpret the ﬁndings from the above analysis about closure and
outcomes as suggestive evidence.
II Data Description
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (AddHealth) surveyed every student
in a representative sample of 142 US public and private middle and high schools in 1994 and
1995 (Udry 2003). Each of these 85,627 students reported demographics, recent grades and
extracurricular activities, health outcomes and their feelings about their school environment.
As part of the survey students were asked to name up to 10 friends - 5 male and 5 female.
4We use this information to construct an “OR-social network” where a direct link between
two students exists if one of them names the other one as a friend. We obtain our core
sample by excluding 7,779 students who are in connected components of size smaller than
20 (7,138 form clusters of size 1). This is because network statistics become less meaningful
for such small components; in particular, closure is undeﬁned for clusters of size 1.
We compute our trust ﬂow measure for K =2 .0 for all pairs of agents in the core sample,
as well as the (m,K)-closure measure for m = 2 developed above.4 We also compute network
degree, the number of neighbors for each agent.
We measure community size by the number of students in the student’s grade at her
school.5 We use categorical indicators to control for four observables: the student’s grade
(6 to 12), her ethnicity (white or non-white), her father’s education (less than high-school,
high-school, college) and her school’s location (urban, sub-urban or rural). We also include
controls for fractionalization in some regressions. For grade, ethnicity, and education, frac-
tionalization is the probability that two people chosen randomly from the cluster will be of
di erent categories.
We focus on three outcome variables: TROUBLE is the student’s response to the ques-
tion, “Since school started this year, how often have you had trouble getting along with
other students?” with 0 being “never” and 4 being “everyday.” FEELSAFE is the student’s
response to the question, “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following state-
ment: ‘I feel safe in my school’,” which we have coded from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5
(“strongly agree”). GPA is the average of the student’s most recent grades in english, math,
history, and science.
III Results
Community Size and Network Closure. We begin with a graphical analysis. Figure 2 plots
our measure of network closure for schools with grade sizes above and below the median
size, holding ﬁxed a student’s number of friends (degree). The ﬁgure provides preliminary
evidence for our main hypothesis by showing that in our data, large schools tend to have
lower network closure. It is important to note that this correlation between size and closure
holds even when we control for number of friends. While degree and closure are correlated
with each other, grade size generates variation in closure beyond its e ect on the degree
4Using m = 1 does not a ect our qualitative results, nor does using K =2 .5.
5In most American high schools, students attend multiple classes with di erent groups of students, so
we expect their social networks to be inﬂuenced by school size rather than by classroom size. Our focus on
school size distinguishes the current paper from the body of econometric work on class size.
5distribution.
These observations are also reﬂected in the regression analysis in Table 1, where we
estimate (1) in di erent speciﬁcations. Increasing the number of students in a grade is
correlated with lower closure both in the simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
as well as in speciﬁcations where we include ﬁxed e ects for the number of friends of a
student. Including a rich set of controls such as grade composition within the connected
component, school location, parents’ education, racial composition as well as demographic
fractionalization does not change our results. The ﬁxed e ect estimates suggest that a one
standard deviation increase in grade size is associated with a decrease in closure by about
0.12 of a standard deviation.
Closure and Outcomes. Table 2 presents estimates of equations (2) and (3) for our three
outcome variables (FEELSAFE, TROUBLE and GPA). In all speciﬁcations we include ﬁxed
e ects for number of friends, as well as the full set of controls used in the fourth column of
table 1.
Columns FS1 and GPA1 show that students in larger schools feel less safe and also
have signiﬁcantly lower GPA. These results are consistent with the notion that grade size
is negatively related to educational and social outcomes. However, somewhat surprisingly,
there is a negative relationship between having trouble with other students and grade size
(column TR1). A one-standard deviation increase in grade size is associated with about a
0.04 standard deviation decrease in the FEELSAFE measure, and a 0.06 standard deviation
decrease for GPA.
To assess the extent to which the e ect of grade size on outcomes is mediated through
network closure, we then include closure in the right hand side of our regressions. As columns
FS2, TR2 and GPA2 show, closure is positively correlated with good outcomes: the coef-
ﬁcient of closure is strongly signiﬁcant and has the right sign in all three speciﬁcations.
Moreover, focusing on the FEELSAFE and GPA outcomes where grade size predicts worse
outcomes, we also ﬁnd that including closure signiﬁcantly reduces the grade size coe cient.
The drop in the e ect of grade size is between one fourth and one third for these two out-
comes. These results suggest that a substantial part of the e ect of size on FEELSAFE and
GPA is mediated through the closure channel.
We interpret our outcome estimates as suggestive evidence supporting Coleman’s (1990)
claim that higher closure generates prosocial behavior. Mobius and Szeidl (2006) predicts
such a positive relationship if agents engage in high-value transactions within the network.
Coming to the help of fellow students or helping friends who lag behind academically might
qualify as such “high-value” favors.
6IV Conclusion
In this paper we argue that community size can a ect outcomes by inﬂuencing the intercon-
nectedness of social networks. Using the AddHealth dataset, we have shown that there is
a strong association between grade size and network closure, which is robust to controlling
for the degree distribution of the social network. We also provided suggestive evidence that
this relationship between size and closure can inﬂuence trust-related outcomes.
Unfortunately, the AddHealth dataset contains a small number of outcomes where the
role of the social network is likely to be important. It would be interesting to apply our
methodology to data with more outcome variables. In particular, we propose dividing the
analysis by “high-value” and “low-value” services provided by the social network (such as
ﬁnancial support versus information exchanged with a social network). This would allow us
to test whether networks with lower closure can sometimes provide greater utility to agents
who have a demand for “low-value” services (as suggested by Burt (1995)).
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8Table 1: OLS and ﬁxed e ects regressions of network (2,2)-closure on grade size.
OLS FE FE-controls Fract-controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Students in Grade -0.040 -0.032 -0.026 -0.026
(0.0007)   (0.0004)   (0.0005)   (0.0005)  
Const. 0.822 0.800 0.770 0.722
(0.002)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.011)  
Obs. 77,848 77,848 77,848 77,848
R2 0.036 0.069 0.095 0.095
Standard errors in parentheses. See the text for deﬁnition of (2,2)-closure. Fixed e ect is for number of
friends of student. Unit of grade size is 100 students. In column 3 we control for student’s grade, school
location (rural, suburban and urban), parents’ education and racial composition. In column 4 we additionally
include the demographic fractionalization controls. **Signiﬁcantly di erent from 0 at the 1-percent level.
Table 2: E ect of grade size on outcomes for FEELSAFE (FS), TROUBLE (TR) and GPA,
without and with (2,2)-closure.
FS1 FS2 TR1 TR2 GPA1 GPA2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(2,2)-Closure 0.315 -0.415 0.427
(0.025)   (0.033)   (0.018)  
Students in Grade -0.029 -0.021 -0.021 -0.032 -0.033 -0.022
(0.003)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.002)  
Const. 3.747 3.512 1.697 2.005 2.688 2.368
(0.075)   (0.078)   (0.098)   (0.101)   (0.056)   (0.058)  
Obs. 69,042 69,042 73,780 73,780 68,220 68,220
R2 0.022 0.024 0.04 0.042 0.047 0.054
Standard errors in parentheses. All columns include ﬁxed e ects for number of friends. Unit of grade size
is 100 students. All regressions include controls for student’s grade, school location (rural, suburban and
urban), parents’ education, racial composition, as well as demographic fractionalization. **Signiﬁcantly
di erent from 0 at the 1-percent level.
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Figure 1: Low closure (left) and high closure (right) social networks with identical link
distribution (K =1 .5). Agent s enjoys the same amount of average trust in both networks -
in low closure network she can ask 4 agents for favors worth at most 1 while in high closure
network she can ask 2 agents for favors worth at most 2.
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Figure 2: Mean (2,2)-closure by number of friends for schools with grade size below median
size (solid line) and schools with grade size above median size (dashed). See the text for
deﬁnition of (2,2)-closure.
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